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4	 Taxing coins is deemed to be unnecessary, since storing great quantities of small change would incur high 
costs (Goodfriend 2000, pp. 1015).
5	 According Krugman (1998) Japan was facing a liquidity trap. 
6	 For a review on the history and current proposals of negative interest rates see Ilgmann and Menner (2011). 












































10	 This is in compliance with Keynes’ statement, that a distinction between the “unit of account” and the “currency” 








































































Suppose the economy is in a recession and the risk of firm failure – the probability, that neither 
interest nor redemption will be paid – is
 
0 < Rf < 1. The central bank`s base rate, which is also 
used as discount rate in bank calculations, is i > 0. Then, in the simplest case of a credit for 
one period, the present value of this credit is
PVf = –1+
1+ r f 1– R f





0 = 1+ i
1– R f
–1 .  (2)
Obviously, this minimum required market interest rate inclines in Rf and inclines in i, so the 
central bank could principally lower r0
f 
by simply reducing the base rate, if necessary even 
below zero. However, there is a lower bound because of the alternative of simply holding cash, ulrich VAn suntum, mEtin kAPtAn, And cordElius ilgmAnn
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which earns a positive interest if the base rate is negative. The present value of this alternative is
PVc = –1+ 1



































13	 Note that this idea is decisively different from simply raising inflation expectations via a long term commitment 
to expansionary policy, which is frequently proposed for escaping the zero bound (see for example Jung et al. 
2005).rEducing thE lowEr bound on mArkEt intErEst rAtEs
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n – 1 – R f
1 – R f S 1 + i
n + 1 – 1 1 + i
n .	 (7)
(7) reduces to (2) for n = 1 and approaches r0
f = i/(1 – Rf) for n → ∞.
Because S ≥ 1, with a given base rate i, the required firm interest rate ) (
0 n rf declines in n. The 
simple intuition is that the credit, after the firm has survived the first (recession) period, pays 
interest above i for n −1 additional periods. Hence the lower interest bound on market rates 
declines in n. In order to show this, the present value of holding cash is calculated analogously 
to (3):








1 – R f S 1 + i
n + 1 – 1 1 + i





for	i =	0,	one	has	to	calculate	the	limiting	value	of	(9)	for	i → 0,	which	is	a	generalization	of	(4):
lim r f
c n;i → 0 =
Rf






In addition, our model is also helpful to explain the harm done by public deficit spending. 
Holding cash is not the only alternative for giving credits to firms. Another option, being 
particularly relevant in a crisis, is lending money to the government, as long as it is perceived 
as credit worthy. In a recession, not only government deficit spending is typically extended, 
but public bonds are also exceptionally attractive as an asset because of their relative low risk. 
Suppose that government bonds pay interest rg and bear a risk Rg, the latter being defined 
analogous to Rf  above. The present value PVg of investing in bonds with term n in Period 1 is 
given by (5) again, replacing rf and Rf by rg and Rg respectively. With the same substitutions, 








n − 1 – R f 1 − Rg
1 – R f 1 + i
n − 1 − Rg
.  (11)ulrich VAn suntum, mEtin kAPtAn, And cordElius ilgmAnn
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Equation (11) gives a straight relationship between rg and rf. At first glance, both rg and rf are 
only dependent on the base rate and on their respective risks parameter. However, one has 
to take into consideration that R is a subjective assessment which will normally vary among 
capital lenders. If more capital is demanded, more capital lenders who are relatively pessimistic 
and cautious must be persuaded to invest. Therefore, R is not the average but the marginal 
value of risk assessment, and hence the lower bound of the market interest rate for firm credits 
increases by public deficit spending. 
The figures below give an impression of the relevant relations. Figure 1 shows the change 
in the market rates which is caused by a change in (perceived) default risk of firm credit. If the 
latter were zero, the interest curve would simply be a 45o line through the origin. The underlying 
numerical assumptions in Figure 1 are n =1, and Rf = 10% and 15% respectively. Under the 
constraint that nominal interest rates cannot be negative, the lower interest bounds for market 
rates will be rc
f  (Rf  =	10%)	=11,11%
 
and rc
f  (Rf  =15%)	=17.65%
 
respectively according to (10). 
Figure 1 
Figure 1 shows the impact of a term extension on the lower interest bound (for the case 
with Rf =	10%). With n = 5, the latter decreases to r f
c n =5 =2 .2%, which is – in accordance 
with (10) – only one fifth of the former value, which was r f
c n =1 =1 1.11%. Therefore, while 
the rise of public debt increases the minimum market interest rate, the latter can substantially 
be lowered by a prolongation of the term for which central bank credits are given at a 
guaranteed low base rate. In the limiting case of n → ∞, the lower interest bound was even 








Against this rather simple proposal, various objections may be raised. For example, it 
might be objected that the banks could simply hoard the cheap money they borrow interest-
free from the central bank in the first (critical) period and only start lending it afterwards 
when perceived risk decreases, thereby circumventing the initial purpose of the measure. 
Since we assumed that the risk is zero after Period 1, from Period 2 on the money could 
actually be lent at a very low interest which is just about sufficient to compensate for the 
zero revenue in Period 1. This does not invoke a real problem, however, because competition 
on the financial market would eventually make the present value of this strategy zero too, 
so no disincentive concerning the strategy of immediate lending to firms occurs. 
Another objection might point to the fact that default risks differ among firms, so scream 
skimming could occur by lending the cheap money just to those firms which are least affected 
by the crisis. Again, however, this is only a pseudo-problem, since in a market economy, 
adjusting the interest rate to the default risk of a specific firm is one of the key reasons why 
a financial sector exists. For firms with different risks Rf  will simply have to pay different 
interest rates rf according to (9) respectively, with all of these lending contracts having in 
common that their present value for the banks is zero in equilibrium. Nevertheless, all of these 
firms will benefit from the monetary policy described above by a decrease in the particular 
interest rate which fits their specific risk. One might also argue that flooding financial markets 
Figure 2ulrich VAn suntum, mEtin kAPtAn, And cordElius ilgmAnn
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with long term liquidity may raise inflation expectations and inflation respectively. Again 
this is a welcomed side effect. As mentioned afore, probable commitment to a high rate of 
inflation is considered to be one possible way out of the liquidity trap since a rise in price 
level sets the same incentives as taxing currency. 
Last but not least there is one problem that the above proposed method cannot solve. 
If the perceived long term default risk remains high due to a persistent lack of economic 
confidence, long term contracts will have no effects on the floor to market rates. In fact, 
the effectiveness of our scheme hinges on the fact that long term prospects are better than 
short run expectations. Beyond this, it is also possible that credit demand remains low due 
to a lack in economic confidence in the private sector. Thus simply increasing the supply 
of capital will not be enough to restart the economy. In this case, a demand stimulus in 
combination with good governance and structural change would be appropriate (Ullersma 































c n; i → 0 =
Rf
1 − R f n
  (12)
Equation	(12),	respectively	(10)	follows	from:
lim	S (i → 0)=n.   (13)
To proof the latter relationship, S needs to be derived:
 	 




2 + … + 1
1 + i
n − 1.  (14)
This finite geometric series will be multiplied by  1
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− 1
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1 + i − 1
.
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